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Abstract
The global demand for cashew nuts continues to increase steadily. However, many
African countries face difficulties in marketing and adding value to the product. Using
recent survey data of 391 cashew farmers in Ghana, this paper contributes to the grow-
ing evidence on the significance of contract farming (CF) in improving the welfare
of rural households in developing countries. Specifically, the paper analyzes the fac-
tors that influence cashew farmers’ decisions to participate in CF, and the impact
of participation on farmers’ performance. We employ a recently developed switch-
ing regression model with endogenous explanatory variables and endogenous switch-
ing to control for selection bias caused by observable and unobservable factors. The
empirical results show that participation in CF significantly increases labor produc-
tivity and price margins, as well as cashew yields, and net revenues. A disaggregated
analysis of the sample into farm size categories reveals that small-sized cashew farms
tend to benefit more through CF, compared to medium- and large-sized farms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The need for higher levels of managed coordination has grown
due to rapid changes in global food markets (Minot & Sawyer,
2016). Rather than relying on commodities purchased at farm
gate or spot markets, buyers rely more on complex supply
chains. Nevertheless, smallholder farmers were hindered from
innovating and participating in those agrifood value chains,
due to the low investments in market systems and infrastruc-
ture in the past (Dendena & Corsi, 2014).
In order to facilitate smallholder farmers’ participation in
managed agrifood value chains, contract farming (CF) has
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received much attention in recent years (Ragasa, Lambrecht,
& Kufoalor, 2018; Reardon, Timmer, Barrett, & Berdegue,
2003). CF plays an increasingly important role in developing
countries, as it addresses constraints related to inadequate
access to credit and extension services, market failures, risk,
and high transaction costs (Miyata, Minot, & Hu, 2009).
Moreover, CF allows farmers to overcome market entry barri-
ers and provides smallholder farmers access to modern tech-
nologies, quality control, and marketing (Mishra, Kumar,
Joshi, & D’Souza, 2018b).
Several studies have analyzed the impact of CF on small-
holder farmers in developing countries on various crops. Most
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of these studies show positive impacts of CF on welfare indi-
cators such as household income, farm productivity, and food
security (Bernard, Hidrobo, Le Port, & Rawat, 2019; Harou,
Walker, & Barrett, 2017; Maertens & Velde, 2017; Mishra
et al., 2018b; Miyata et al., 2009). However, the empirical evi-
dence on this topic remains inconclusive in the development
debate (Bellemare & Bloem, 2018). In particular, some argue
that companies take advantage of cheap labor and transfer pro-
duction risk to farmers and thus making farmers worse off
(Miyata et al., 2009). CF can even contribute to increased
inequality within regions, as buyers often buy from areas with
better roads, easier access to water, or from support areas
of NGOs and other donors (Barrett et al., 2012). Moreover,
income from labor markets and nonfarm business might get
sacrificed due to CF (Bellemare, 2018).
Very few studies have extended their analysis on how fac-
tors like output prices and labor inputs contribute to the
improvement of smallholders welfare through CF (Belle-
mare, 2018; Benali, Brümmer, & Afari-Sefa, 2018; Mishra,
Kumar, Joshi, & D’Souza, 2018a). Participation in CF gener-
ally evolves in response to market imperfections particularly
that of labor inputs due to moral hazard and high monitor-
ing costs in developing countries (Casaburi, Kremer, & Mul-
lainathan, 2016). The present study therefore contributes to
the debate on welfare impacts of CF by examining the poten-
tial of CF for job creation and income generation. More specif-
ically, we look at whether participation in CF increases labor
productivity, off-farm income, and price margins of small-
holder farmers. We use recently collected household data of
391 Ghanaian cashew farmers from Brong-Ahafo and North-
ern regions. These regions are Ghana´s major areas of cashew
production (African Cashew Initiative, 2010). Cashew is the
second most important smallholder cash crop in terms of
export value in Ghana. Despite the central role of cashew for
the Ghanaian economy, there is a lack of knowledge about
how CF shapes cashew production and incomes.
Another aspect of our analysis is the introduction of het-
erogeneity in impacts by scale of operation. This enables us
to show whether the effects of CF is uniform across different
farm size categories. The significance in this also has to do
with our ability to show at what levels of operation CF plays
complementary role to off-farm income, and at what level it
could negatively, if any, affect off-farm income. This will be
very important in designing policies that aim at supporting
CF and off-farm employment by knowing which segment of
farmers to target. Likewise, it will provide policy makers with
insights into the multidimensional effects of participation in
CF, as well as enhance the understanding of the mechanisms
through which CF affects welfare (Bellemare & Bloem, 2018;
Upton & Lentz, 2017).
However, a major problem in examining the effects of CF
is that participation in CF is not randomly assigned across
farm households, because farmers may self-select into CF.
Therefore, the estimation must consider unobserved hetero-
geneity that could simultaneously affect the CF decision and
the dependent variables. The limitation in approaches used in
past studies has been noted by Bellemare and Bloem (2018)
and Ton, Vellema, Desiere, Weituschat, and D’Haese (2018).
Most studies have either used instrumental variable (IV)
approach (Simmons, Winters, & Patrick, 2005), or propen-
sity score matching (PSM) technique (Mishra et al., 2018b) to
account for selection bias. The issue of instrument relevance
and validity in the context of highly heterogeneous depen-
dence effects of CF in our context, make the IV approach
alone not suitable. A well-known shortcoming of PSM is its
inability to account for unobservable factors among farmers
such as innate skills and risk preferences, which may result in
biased and inconsistent estimates (Ma & Abdulai, 2016).
We use a control function approach combined with IV esti-
mation following Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2016) to
estimate both, the participation decision and the outcomes.
Different to applying IV methods directly, the control func-
tion accounts for the correlation of endogenous explanatory
variables with the endogenous switching indicator, which is
CF participation in our case. This makes the control function
approach for linear models more consistent, than only apply-
ing IV methods. As a result, we are able to account for poten-
tial endogeneity, many sources of heterogeneity, and self-
selection based on both observable and unobservable factors.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of the development of the cashew
sector in Ghana. Section 3 describes the data used in the anal-
ysis. Section 4 outlines the empirical framework employed
in the analysis and presents the details of our estimation
and identification strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical
results, while conclusions of our study are presented in the
final section.
2 THE CASHEW MARKET IN
GHANA
Cashew trees grow in most tropical countries around the
world, with production more than doubling in the last
16 years to almost 5 million tons in 2016. West Africa pro-
duces together with South-Eastern Asia, about 90% (45%
each) of the world’s raw cashew nuts (Rabany, Rullier, &
Ricau, 2015). In 2014, cashew became the second main cash
crop in terms of export value behind Cocoa in Ghana (MoFA,
2017). Cashew cultivation is a major source of income for
about 75,000 Ghanaian smallholder farmers. Since the har-
vest of the nuts takes place during the lean season, it ensures
their livelihood by generating additional income. Therefore,
cashew can assume a crucial role in food and nutrition security






































F I G U R E 1 Development of raw cashew production quantity in Ghana (in tons) (FAO, 2018) [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
requires low production inputs, it can also serve as an adapta-
tion strategy to reduce the adverse impacts of climate change.
Cashew cultivation in Ghana started in the 1960s with spo-
radic plantings in the Central and Greater Accra Regions,
and later spread to Brong-Ahafo and Northern Regions. In
the 1970s, the industry suffered a setback due to issues such
as low producer prices, underdeveloped market structures,
and inadequate information regarding appropriate husbandry
practices which led to low interest in the crop, with many
established cashew plantations abandoned. With the introduc-
tion of the Economic Recovery Program in 1983, cashew was
identified as one of the major nontraditional crops to be devel-
oped as part of the Government’s efforts to diversify the coun-
try’s export base. Commodity markets were therefore liber-
alized, thus providing opportunities for farmers to sell raw
cashew nuts. As a result, cashew farmers reinvested resources
to rehabilitate some of the abandoned farms. Increasing trade
between Asia and Africa and strong global demand for cashew
boosted this new sector, and offered new opportunities for
smallholder farmers who massively invested in cashew farm-
ing (Rabany et al., 2015).
About 88% of cashew farmers in Ghana are smallhold-
ers, with farms ranging in size from 0.8 to 3 hectare (ha).
Only 12% are large plantations, with farm sizes between 4
and 40 ha (Wongnaa & Awunyo-Vitor, 2013). Figure 1 shows
that raw cashew nut production in Ghana more than tripled
over a period of 10 years from about 30,000 tons in 2007 to
90,000 tons in 2017 (FAO, 2018). Moreover, production is
projected to increase to about 225,000 tons in 2025 (Rabany
et al., 2015). Average yield levels of raw cashew nuts vary
between 350 and 650 kg/ha. This reveals potential for higher
output under required production conditions and labor input
(African Cashew Initiative, 2010).
The development of the cashew sector in Ghana has given
birth to numerous functional farmer associations, processing
plants, and traders linked to the industry. Ghana´s access to the
sea and a relatively well-developed major road network across
the country provides ideal conditions for cashew processing.
Value addition is an important issue in order to generate jobs
and to obtain higher prices, as the country still earns only a
fragment of the cashew nut value chain. However, in compar-
ison with other West African countries such as Ivory Coast
or Benin, Ghana’s cashew sector is a relatively small player
and less advanced in fulfilling its potential in production and
marketing. It is only responsible for about 2.6% of global raw
cashew nut production (FAO, 2018; Heinrich, 2012; Rabany
et al., 2015).
3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS
The data used in the present study come from a household sur-
vey that was conducted from August to October 2017 in the
Brong-Ahafo and Northern regions of Ghana. A multistage
random sampling procedure was used to select farm house-
holds for the interviews. First, Brong-Ahafo region and North-
ern region were purposively selected, based on the national
intensity of cashew production. In a second step, four districts
with intensive cashew cultivation were chosen. These include
Nkoranza, Techiman, and Wenchi districts in Brong-Ahafo
region, as well as Bole district in the Northern region. We next
randomly selected four communities per district (in Bole eight
communities), using a sampling frame provided by cashew
buyers and community chiefs. Finally, contract farmers and
noncontract farmers were proportionately selected from each
community randomly.
The data set consists of 391 cashew farming households
from 20 villages, of which 177 are participants in CF and 214
are nonparticipants. Identified farmers answered a detailed
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questionnaire on individual sociodemographic data; farm and
plot-level characteristics that cover the management of the
cashew farm, marketing of cashew nuts, contract relations
with buyers, farmer’s perceptions of cashew business and CF,
as well as nonincome wealth indicators.
Smallholder cashew farmers in our sample produce and
supply raw cashew nuts to buyers, using contracts or spot mar-
ket transactions. These buyers are private companies, aggre-
gators, traders, and processors1. The sample consists of 45%
contract farmers. Almost all contracts (97.6%) are verbal
agreements between the farmer and the buyer, with only 2.4%
of written contracts. The main provisions that are included in
the contracts are grading and quality requirements (nut size
and weight), and the harvest time. The majority of contract
farmers (92%) report cashew farming as their primary source
of income, while 83% of noncontract farmers declare cashew
farming as their most important income activity.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of differences
in characteristics between contract and noncontract farmers.
Given that the focus of this study is to examine the drivers of
participation in CF, as well as the factors through which CF
affects farm productivity and incomes, we draw on existing lit-
erature on CF to identify explanatory variables (Miyata et al.,
2009; Wang, Wang, & Delgado, 2014). Table 1 reveals that the
proportion of women participating in CF is significantly lower
compared to noncontract farmers. Moreover, contract farmers
are significantly older, and they own significantly larger and
older cashew farms than noncontract farmers.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for incomes and
agricultural productivity used as outcome variables in this
study. It shows that cashew yields, net revenues, and farm
incomes are significantly higher for contract farmers, while
their off-farm income is significantly lower compared to non-
contract farmers. For instance, cashew yields of contract farm-
ers are on average 523 kg/ha, which is above the national
average cashew yield of 500 kg/ha (MoFA, 2017). The higher
yields obtained by cashew farmers could suggest their access
to better information about cultivation of the crops, as well
as access to production inputs. The effect of participation
in CF on off-farm work is not clear-cut, since participa-
tion in the off-farm labor market may restrict production and
decision-making activities, thereby decreasing farm produc-
tivity. On the other hand, increased off-farm work reduces
financial constraints, particularly for resource-poor farmers,
and thus enables them to purchase productivity enhancing
inputs (Abdulai & Huffman, 2000; Benali et al., 2018).
As indicated earlier, participation in CF typically arises in
response to market imperfections particularly that of labor
1 Examples of the private companies that contract with smallholder cashew
farmers in Ghana include Olam International, Rajkumar Impex Ghana Ltd.,
Unicom Commodities Ghana Ltd., and Mim Cashew & Agricultural Products
Ltd.
inputs due to moral hazard and high monitoring costs in
developing countries (Casaburi et al., 2016; Wendimu, Hen-
ningsen, & Czekaj, 2017). To gain some insights into the
impacts of CF on farm performance and household welfare,
we extend our analysis to capture the impact of CF on labor
productivity and price margins. Labor productivity measures
the quantity of harvested cashew nuts in kilograms per total
labor days of family and hired workers. Price margins is the
difference of received cashew prices per kg minus the pro-
duction input costs per kg output. Cashew generally does not
require much input for operation, once the trees are matured.
However, to reduce losses associated with rotting, collec-
tion of cashew nuts on time is very important. Ensuring the
required amount of labor input at the appropriate time is there-
fore necessary. Thus, we expect that participation in CF give
farmers the income and guarantee to engage more hired labor
to carry out the needed activities at the appropriate time.
In summary, Tables 1 and 2 suggest that contract and non-
contract farmers are systematically different across observ-
able characteristics and output variables. This implies that
participation in CF is characterized by potential selectivity
concerns. The simple comparison of mean differences across
contract farmers and noncontract farmers does not account
for unobservable factors and could be biased. We therefore
employ econometric analysis to disentangle the bias driven
by selection in CF and to examine the impact of CF on the
indicated welfare measures.
4 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the theoretical and empirical frame-
work. In particular, we begin with the description of a farmer’s
decision to participate in CF. This is followed by the presen-
tation of the control function approach to estimate a switch-
ing regression with endogenous explanatory variables and
endogenous switching.
The conceptual framework employed in this study consid-
ers the expected net returns 𝑅∗
𝐶
from participation in CF and
the expected net returns 𝑅∗
𝑁
from nonparticipation, with R
representing net returns. Defining the difference between the
expected net returns from participating in CF and not partici-




, a farmer will choose to
participate in CF if the net returns from participation is greater
than the net returns from nonparticipation; that is, 𝑅
∗
> 0.
However,𝑅∗ is latent and thus not observable. Only the choice
of CF participation (𝐷𝑖) can be observed and can be expressed
as a function of observable elements in the following latent
variable model:
𝑅
∗ = 𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖, with𝐷𝑖 = 1 if 𝑅
∗
> 0, (1)
where 𝐷𝑖 is the CF participation indicator that takes the
value of one, if the household participates in CF, and zero
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T A B L E 1 Household characteristics of contract and noncontract farmers




(N = 214) Mean diff.
Age Age of household head (years) 54.864 (13.717) 52.177 (14.401) 2.687*
Female headed
HH
1 if household head is female,
0 otherwise
0.198 (0.399) 0.312 (0.465) −0.115***
Education 1 if a farmer’s level of education is at
least primary school (≥6 years),
0 otherwise
0.616 (0.488) 0.542 (0.499) 0.074
Household size Number of persons living in the
household
7.762 (3.446) 7.748 (3.877) 0.015
Farm size Total cashew area (ha) 3.995 (2.966) 3.163 (2.335) 0.832***
Soil type 1 if fertile soil, 0 otherwise 0.384 (0.488) 0.402 (0.491) 0.018
Farm age Age of cashew farm (years) 12.850 (6.360) 11.100 (5.914) 1.751***
Farm records 1 if farmer keeps farm records,
0 otherwise
0.147 (0.355) 0.056 (0.231) 0.091***
Market 1 if community has market,
0 otherwise
0.282 (0.451) 0.238 (0.427) 0.044
Farmer group 1 if farmer is farm group member,
0 otherwise
0.299 (0.459) 0.257 (0.438) 0.042
Labor Total labor used in cashew
production (days/ha)
50.888 (40.356) 52.414 (35.977) −1.526
Family labor Family labor used in cashew
production (days/ha)
32.329 (27.525) 37.217 (29.193) −4.888*
Hired labor Hired labor used in cashew
production (days/ha)
18.559 (23.901) 15.197 (16.936) 3.362
Mobile phone 1 if farmer owns mobile phone,
0 otherwise
0.706 (0.457) 0.790 (0.408) −0.083*
Motorbike 1 if farmer owns motorbike,
0 otherwise
0.373 (0.485) 0.266 (0.443) 0.107**
Farm radius Number of cashew farmers living in
a 3 km radius around farmhouse
15.469 (12.633) 12.431 (9.114) 3.037***
Access to credit 1 if farmer asked for and received
sufficient credit, 0 otherwise
0.406 (0.490) 0.381 (0.482) 0.025
Extension
service
1 if farmer received extension
services (last 3 years), 0 otherwise
0.542 (0.500) 0.519 (0.501) 0.024
Nkoranza 1 if farm household is located in
Nkoranza district, 0 otherwise
0.232 (0.423) 0.177 (0.383) 0.054
Bole 1 if farm household is located in
Bole district, 0 otherwise
0.384 (0.488) 0.397 (0.490) −0.013
Wenchi 1 if farm household is located in
Wenchi district, 0 otherwise
0.192 (0.395) 0.215 (0.412) −0.023
Techiman 1 if farm household is located in
Techiman district, 0 otherwise
0.192 (0.395) 0.210 (0.408) −0.018
Note. N = 391.
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
if otherwise; 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of observable household and
farm-level characteristics (such as age, gender, education, and
farm size) expected to influence the participation decision;
𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The error term
𝜇𝑖 is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and
constant variance (𝜎2). As stated before, selection into CF is
not random. Farmers choose to participate or not to partici-
pate in CF based on expected net returns that are subjective
and based on their inherent characteristics and experiences.
This may be driven by unobserved intrinsic characteristics
such as farming skills, risk preferences, or motivation. These
characteristics are likely to affect the CF participation
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T A B L E 2 Cashew production costs and revenues of contract and noncontract farmers




(N = 214) Mean diff.
Farm income Income from farm work
(GHS/ha)
3,480.719 (3,014.245) 2,957.861 (2,462.562) 522.9*
Off-farm income Income from off-farm work
(GHS/ha)
1,618.967 (1,584.18) 2,237.427 (1,952.107) −618.5***
Yield Harvested cashew nuts
(kg/ha)
522.975 (477.620) 411.181 (363.886) 111.0***
Quantity sold Total quantity of cashew nuts
sold (kg)
1,631.42 (1,470.168) 1,164.797 (1,201.306) 466.6***
Price Average Price (GHS/kg) 5.963 (0.671) 5.844 (0.548) 0.040
Gross revenue Gross revenue from cashew
sales (GHS/ha)
2,950.885 (2,702.906) 2,420.414 (2,317.602) 530.5**
Production costs Total input costs for cashew
production (GHS/kg)
1.907 (1.902) 2.151 (3.552) −0.234
Net revenue Gross revenue minus costs for
agricultural inputs and
labor (GHS/ha)
2,332.053 (2,531.876) 1,873.791 (2,060.555) 458.3**
Note. N = 391.
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
Standard deviation in parentheses. The figures refer to cropping season 2016/2017.
decision and farmers’ productivity and incomes simultane-
ously, leading to potential endogeneity problem, since the
covariance between the decision to participate and the error
term in Equation (1) will not be equal to zero. As such, causal
identification of participation requires an instrument that is
strongly correlated with the participation decision, but does
not directly affect the outcomes. We will discuss the applied
instrument later in this section.
Following Equation (1), we express the probability of par-
ticipation in CF as:
Pr (𝐷𝑖 = 1) = Pr (𝑅
∗
> 0) = Pr (𝜇𝑖 > 𝑍𝑖𝛽)
= 1 − 𝐹 (−𝑍𝑖𝛽), (2)
where F is the cumulative distribution function for 𝜇𝑖.
In order to link CF participation decision to the potential
outcomes, we follow the approach by Ma and Abdulai (2016)







− 𝐶𝑖𝑊 , (3)
where 𝑃 is the output price per kg, 𝑄𝑖 is the cashew yield
in kg, 𝑊 is a vector of input prices, 𝐶𝑖 is a vector of input
quantities (e.g., fertilizer, pesticides, and labor), and 𝑍𝑖 is a
vector of farm- and household-level characteristics. Following
Equations (1) and (3), we express net returns (𝑅) as a function
of input and output prices, the choice of CF participation (𝐷𝑖),
and farm- and household-level characteristics as follows:
𝑅 = 𝑅(𝑃 , 𝐶𝑖, 𝐷𝑖, 𝑍𝑖). (4)
Also applying Hoteling’s lemma directly to Equation (3)
yields a reduced form of the following cashew output supply
function:
𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑃 , 𝐶𝑖, 𝐷𝑖, 𝑍𝑖). (5)
Equations (4) and (5) suggest that net returns from cashew
production (R) and cashew yields (𝑄) are influenced by the
input and output prices, the choice of participation in CF, and
farm- and household-level characteristics. Following Ito, Bao,
and Su (2012), we decompose net farm income into labor (𝐿)
productivity (𝑄∕𝐿) and price margin (𝑃 − 𝐶𝑊 ∕𝑄) in order
to evaluate the differential impact of these variables on CF.
As indicated earlier, we are not only interested in farmer’s
decisions on participation in CF, but also in the impact of par-
ticipation on cashew yields, net revenues, labor productivity,
price margins, as well as off-farm income. If we define X as a
vector of farm and household characteristics, we can express
the link between the CF participation decision with the out-
come variables.2 Therefore, we assume that the vector of out-
come variables is a linear function of a vector of explanatory
variables that include the participation decision, as well as
farm- and household-level features, specified as:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛾 +𝐷𝑖𝜂 + 𝑢𝑖, (6)
where 𝑦𝑖 represents a vector of outcome variables such as
cashew yields, net revenues, labor productivity, price margins,
2 𝑍𝑖 contains an instrument that is excluded in 𝑋𝑖 for identification.
DUBBERT 755
and off-farm income; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables
such as household characteristics (e.g., age, education, and
household size), farm and location characteristics, and finan-
cial and institutional variables (e.g., extension service and
access to credit); 𝐷𝑖 represents the CF participation dummy
as defined above; 𝛾 and 𝜂 are parameters to be estimated, and
𝑢𝑖 is the error term.
Given that farmers self-select into participating in CF,
selection bias may arise due to observed and unobserved
attributes. Therefore, ordinary least square (OLS) method
might generate biased and inconsistent estimates. In the
present study, we employ the control function approach pro-
posed by Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2016) to estimate
an endogenous switching regression model with endogenous
explanatory variables. The control function approach is com-
bined with IV estimates. This enables us to allow for more
than one continuous endogenous explanatory variable. Dif-
ferent to applying IV methods directly, the control function
accounts for the correlation of endogenous explanatory vari-
ables with exogenous variables. This makes the control func-
tion approach more consistent and efficient than only applying
IV estimation.
Specifically, the approach involves estimating a control
function of a probit model in the first-stage and two-staged
least squares (2SLS) of the outcome models in the second
stage. Following our participation equation (1), we express
the first-stage probit of CF participation as:
𝐷𝑖 = 1[𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 > 0]. (7)
In order to ensure identification and exclusion restriction,
we need to have an instrument that is correlated with the CF
participation decision at the first stage, but does not directly
correlate with the outcome variables in the second stage.
Thus, we use farm radius as an instrument (see Table 1). The
variable farm radius measures the number of other cashew
farmers living in a 3 km radius around the farm household.
This is a valid and relevant instrument because we expect
that CF participation informs the extent to which farmers are
clustered in a given location. When the level of clustering is
high, farmers are more likely to interact among themselves
making information externalities about themselves high and
vice versa in the case of less clustered locations (Michelson,
2017). In addition, companies will be more likely to engage
farmers who are more clustered. A higher cluster density
enhances access to farmers and aggregation of output at rela-
tively lower cost, compared to locations where cashew farm-
ers are less populated and companies have to invest more time
and resources in locating farmers (Barrett et al., 2012). The
benefits of clustering in CF accrue more to the buying compa-
nies since they tend to enjoy lower transportation and search
costs. Therefore, we do not expect it to affect the outcomes
directly. However, if one argues that the proximity of farm-
ers to each other influences their participation in CF, then, for
example in the case of extreme weather events, the yields of
all farmers living in the area can be influenced. Following Ma
and Abdulai (2016), we account for this by including district
fixed effects in our model, since climatic conditions stay con-
stant over time. As evident from Appendix B, the employed
instrument is uncorrelated with the outcome variables.
We estimate the probit of CF participation and obtain the
generalized residuals, which are then used in the second stage
to account for sample selection and issues of unobserved
heterogeneity. We then insert the residuals and their interac-
tions with the CF variable into Equation (6) to account for
sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity as follows:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝐷𝑖𝛽𝐷 +𝑋𝑖𝛽1 +𝐷𝑖𝑋𝑖𝛽2 + 𝑚𝑖𝛽𝑚 +𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑖𝛽𝐷𝑚
+ 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝜌0 +𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑖𝜌1 + 𝑣𝑖, (8)
with E(𝑣𝑖|𝐷𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 0, where 𝐷𝑖 represents the CF partici-
pation and is the endogenous switching indicator, which is
also interacted with all other variables in the model in this
approach. Thus, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of exogenous covariates and
𝐷𝑖𝑋𝑖 is the interaction of CF participation and these exoge-
nous covariates, 𝑔𝑟𝑖 is the generalized residual from the first-
stage CF participation probit, and 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑖 is the interaction
between the endogenous switching indicator and the gen-
eralized residuals. 𝜌0 and 𝜌1 are coefficients of the vari-
ables meant to account for unobserved heterogeneity and self-
selection issues. The coefficients of the generalized residuals
(𝜌0) and the interacted generalized residuals (𝜌1) have econo-
metric interpretations. First, if 𝜌0 or 𝜌1 are statistically signifi-
cant, this would indicate the presence of selection bias arising
from unobservable factors. Hence, taking into account both
observable and unobservable factors is a prerequisite to derive
consistent estimates of treatment effects. Second, if 𝜌0 or 𝜌1
have alternative signs, it means that farmers choose to par-
ticipate in CF based on their comparative advantage, that is,
participants have above average outcomes, compared to non-
participants, independent of the CF decision. Third, 𝜌1 > 0
implies negative selection bias, suggesting that farmers who
have lower than average outcomes are more likely to choose
to participate in CF. Conversely; 𝜌1 < 0 would suggest pos-
itive selection bias. Given that the outcome variables are all
continuous, we use 2SLS method to estimate Equation (8).
An issue that needs to be addressed in estimating the par-
ticipation decision and the outcome equations is the potential
endogeneity of the variables access to credit and extension
contact. These are denoted as m in Equation (8). Access
to credit is potentially endogenous because farmers who
participate in CF are more likely to have higher incomes and
guaranteed market prices, which in turn improves the credit
worthiness of these farmers, and as such their access to credit.
Extension contact on the other hand could be potentially
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endogenous because some companies provide extension
services to farmers and as a result, such farmers would have
more extension contacts compared to other farmers who
are noncontract farmers. To control for the potential endo-
geneity of these variables in the CF participation equations
(Equations (1) and (7)), we use the control function approach.
Therefore, we estimate first-stage probit models of access
to credit and extension contacts, using farmers’ own percep-
tion of their liquidity status and the perception of extension
service, respectively, as instruments. Expectations and
perceptions are useful predictors of economic behavior. How-
ever, their validity depends on the methods used for eliciting
such information and may raise concerns of possible reverse
causality (Delavande, Giné, & McKenzie, 2011). In fact,
both perception variables for liquidity status and extension
service were determined prior to harvest season. As such, it is
certain that the respondents stated their perceptions on credit
availability and extension service based on their experience in
cashew farming from the previous year. Moreover, as evident
from Appendix C, the employed instruments are uncorrelated
with CF participation. Therefore, we do not expect these vari-
ables to influence the decision to participate in CF directly.
The generalized residuals from these probit models
together with the observed access to credit and access to
extension variables are then included in the specification for
CF participation. To account for the potential endogeneity
of these two variables in the outcome equation, we use the
predicted values of the variables from the first stage in the
second-stage outcome equation. The estimation takes places
in a 2SLS framework. To the extent that the two-step approach
used in the model could result in inefficient estimates, we
bootstrapped our standard errors. This is to ensure they are
robust to uncertainties associated with the first-step estimates
being treated as variables in the second step.
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the estimates of the factors that
influence a farmer’s decision to participate in CF and the
impact of participation in CF on the outcome variables,
namely, cashew yields, net revenues, off-farm incomes, as
well as labor productivity, and price margins. We first dis-
cuss the first-stage probit estimation for the determinants of
participation in CF in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 discusses the
determinants of our outcome variables. The average treatment
effects (ATE) of participation in CF for all the outcomes are
presented in Section 5.3.
5.1 Determinants of participation in CF
Table 3 shows the results of the determinants of CF participa-
tion as in Equations (1) and (7). The model is statistically sig-
T A B L E 3 First-stage estimates: Determinants of contract farming
participation
Contract farming participation
Variables Coeff. Std. Err.
Age 0.010* 0.005
Female headed HH −0.260 0.173
Education 0.282 0.193
Household size −0.020 0.020
Farm size 0.099*** 0.034
Soil type −0.151 0.150
Farm age 0.014 0.013
Farm records 0.637** 0.258
Market 0.002 0.030
Farmer group 0.045 0.182
Labor days 0.001 0.002






Extension service −0.019 0.271
Farm radius 0.021*** 0.380
Res (Credit) 0.131 0.187
Res (Extension service) −0.125 0.007
Constant −1.105** 0.540
Note. N = 391.
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level,
***significant at the 1% level; the reference district is Techiman.
Standard errors are bootstrapped, Log likelihood = −239.089; LR chi2 = 60.36
(p-Value = .000).
nificant as revealed by the LR-chi-squared (p = .000) which
suggests that our variables jointly and significantly explain
participation in CF. The estimates show that the residuals
of our two potentially endogenous variables (i.e., access to
credit and extension service) are not significantly different
from zero, suggesting that these variables are not endogenous
in the model. Our identification instrument, farm radius, posi-
tively affects participation and is statistically significant at the
1% level. The chi-square test between the CF dummy variable
and farm radius variable reveals a p-value of .002, indicating
that the instrument farm radius is significantly different from
zero in the first stage. We further performed the estimation
using the IV approach for our outcome variables as robust-
ness check. The results are presented in Appendix A. The esti-
mates show that the F-statistic is statistically significant and
confirms that farm radius is a valid instrument. This suggests
that an increase in the number of neighboring cashew farm-
ers living in 3 km radius of a farmer’s farmhouse significantly
increases the likelihood of participating in CF.
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Table 3 shows that the coefficient of the variable represent-
ing gender is negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that male farmers are more likely to participate in CF than
their female counterparts. This finding is in line with other
studies that document that women are less likely to participate
in CF (Wang et al., 2014). The coefficients of the variables
farm size and farm records are positive and significantly
different from zero, indicating that farmers cultivating larger
farms and those who keep farm records are more likely to
participate in CF. Mobile phone ownership appears to have a
negative effect on the decision to participate in CF. The usage
of mobile phones is widely considered to help in reducing
marketing, search and transportation costs, and as such
simplify participation in markets. Although, interpersonal
communication is often favored when it comes to building
on business relationships and transactions. This underlines
the significance of CF as a marketing strategy especially for
farmers without access to mobile phones (Mittal & Tripathi,
2009; Molony, 2006). Motorbike ownership appears to have
significant and positive effect on the choice of CF, suggesting
that farmers with access to motorized transportation are more
likely to participate in CF.
5.2 Determinants of CF on outcome variables
Table 4 reports the estimates for the outcome variables as in
Equation (8). The first set of estimates are the effects of the
various variables, noninteracted, on outcomes and the second
set contains the estimates of these variables interacted with
the switching indicator, CF participation.
The lower part of Table 4 shows the estimated correla-
tion coefficients (𝜌0 or 𝜌1) of covariance terms between the
error term of the first-stage probit model (Equation (7)) of
CF participation and the second stage (Equation (8)). The
results show significance of 𝜌1 in the cashew yield equation,
suggesting the existence of self-selection in the participation
decisions. This implies that unobservable factors that influ-
ence farmers’ decisions to participate in CF also affect cashew
yields. Thus, participation in CF may not produce the same
yield impact on noncontract farmers, if they choose to partic-
ipate (Lokshin & Sajaia, 2004). The signs of 𝜌1 are negative,
suggesting positive selection bias. This implies that farmers
with above than average yields and are more likely to partici-
pate in CF.
Farm age is an important determinant of cashew yields, net
revenues, and labor productivity. An additional year obtained
by the farm significantly increases cashew yields of noncon-
tract farmers, but significantly reduces cashew yields, net rev-
enues, and labor productivity of contract farmers. This find-
ing is expected because on average, contract farmers have
older farms than noncontract farmers (see Table 1) and is
in line with the notion that older farms become less produc-
tive than newer ones due to increasing age of trees (Onumah,
Al-Hassan, & Onumah, 2013). Farm size has a negative and
significant effect on cashew yields and labor productivity of
contract farmers, suggesting that contract farmers with larger
farms obtain lower cashew yields and are less productive.
This inverse relationship between farm size and productivity
is in line with findings obtained by Ali and Deininger (2015)
and Casaburi et al. (2016) who show for Rwanda and Kenya,
respectively, that small-sized farms are more productive than
large-sized farms.
Mobile phone ownership exerts a positive and signifi-
cant effect on cashew yields of contract farmers. This con-
firms the findings by Lio and Liu (2006) who found that
information and communication technology (ICT)-based sys-
tems support the exchange of information and lead to
increased agricultural productivity. The district fixed effects
variables show that contract and noncontract farmers espe-
cially from Bole area tend to obtain lower yields and net rev-
enues relative to their counterparts in Techiman district. This
suggests that cashew farmers from the Northern region obtain
significantly lower net revenues and are less productive, com-
pared to cashew farmers from Brong-Ahafo region.
5.3 ATE of CF participation
Equation (8) provides the estimates of the ATE of CF on the
outcome variables (Murtazashvili & Wooldridge, 2016). The
ATE estimates are used to compute the marginal effects that
are reported in Table 5. Unlike the simple mean differences,
we obtain the ATE after accounting for confounders due to
both observable and unobservable characteristics.
The impact of CF is positive and significantly different
from zero for all outcomes except off-farm income. Specif-
ically, a farmer who participates in CF is able to obtain on
average 37% higher cashew yields compared to the mean of
cashew farmers. Similarly, participation in CF would increase
net revenues by almost 36% compared to the average net
revenue of cashew farmers. These findings are consistent
with those by Barrett et al. (2012), that participation in CF
increases farm productivity.
As stated earlier, we also examine the impact of CF partic-
ipation on labor productivity and price margins. We find that
CF participation significantly increases labor productivity by
61%, and price margins by 45%, compared to the average labor
productivity and price margins obtained by cashew farmers.
The impacts on labor productivity and price margins can be
attributed to efficient use of labor associated with the use of
more hired labor by contract farmers and guaranteed prices,
respectively. This finding is in line with Benali et al. (2018),
who showed for vegetable farmers in Tanzania that participa-
tion in modern supply chains increases the likelihood to hire
labor.
In terms of labor, we also observe in Table 1 that contract
farmers use more hired labor than noncontract farmers. The
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farmers Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age 0.011*** 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004* 0.002 0.007** 0.003 0.001 0.002
Female headed HH −0.010 0.115 0.206 0.144 0.079 0.065 0.005 0.085 0.068 0.059
Education 0.127 0.148 −0.062 0.150 −0.137 0.086 0.125 0.104 −0.002 0.060
Household size 0.006 0.015 0.029* 0.015 −0.001 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.006
Farm size −0.015 0.031 −0.091** 0.044 −0.239*** 0.026 0.054** 0.023 −0.031** 0.015
Soil type 0.216** 0.093 0.196 0.134 0.058 0.055 0.105 0.087 0.049 0.047
Farm age 0.055*** 0.013 0.057*** 0.016 −0.012** 0.006 0.043*** 0.009 0.001 0.004
Farm records 0.626** 0.263 0.449 0.314 0.252 0.206 0.517*** 0.190 0.041 0.096
Market −0.022 0.020 −0.006 0.034 0.006 0.012 −0.019 0.015 0.011 0.010
Farmer group −0.389*** 0.121 −0.477*** 0.122 0.038 0.080 −0.353*** 0.087 −0.156*** 0.050
Labor days 0.008*** 0.001 0.005** 0.002 0.005*** 0.001 −0.006*** 0.001 −0.001 0.001
Mobile phone −0.125 0.196 0.236 0.228 0.063 0.089 −0.127 0.121 0.095 0.101
Motorbike 0.078 0.128 −0.084 0.175 0.097 0.074 0.052 0.114 −0.021 0.048
Nkoranza −0.484*** 0.185 −0.728** 0.314 0.006 0.121 −0.351** 0.160 −0.078 0.100
Bole −0.811*** 0.169 −0.705*** 0.229 −0.093 0.092 −0.569*** 0.128 0.033 0.073
Wenchi −0.166 0.142 −0.064 0.284 −0.041 0.094 −0.179 0.125 0.073 0.078
Credit (pr) −0.161 0.124 −0.057 0.161 −0.112 0.097 −0.089 0.095 0.028 0.068
Extension service (pr) 0.137*** 0.051 0.217*** 0.059 0.037 0.029 0.104*** 0.034 0.047** 0.023
Contract farmers
Age −0.012* 0.007 −0.003 0.010 0.000 0.004 −0.008 0.005 −0.004 0.003
Female headed HH −0.104 0.240 −0.458 0.287 0.015 0.112 −0.045 0.191 −0.119 0.115
Education −0.428 0.268 −0.122 0.251 0.080 0.124 −0.388** 0.171 −0.022 0.104
Household size 0.021 0.022 −0.007 0.025 −0.015 0.013 0.029 0.023 −0.001 0.008
Farm size −0.093** 0.040 −0.042 0.058 0.054* 0.030 −0.083** 0.032 0.003 0.021
Soil type −0.085 0.168 0.046 0.228 −0.006 0.069 −0.025 0.143 0.061 0.071
Farm age −0.046*** 0.017 −0.053*** 0.019 0.002 0.007 −0.028* 0.016 0.000 0.007
Farm records −0.844** 0.333 −0.791** 0.371 −0.271 0.216 −0.772*** 0.264 −0.115 0.134
Market 0.003 0.026 0.002 0.041 −0.009 0.016 −0.008 0.024 −0.004 0.015
Farmer group 0.174 0.164 0.154 0.194 −0.075 0.114 0.133 0.147 0.048 0.074
Labor days −0.002 0.003 −0.001 0.004 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
Mobile phone 0.425* 0.256 0.095 0.374 0.098 0.129 0.324 0.217 −0.072 0.143
Motorbike −0.173 0.173 0.026 0.217 −0.122 0.082 −0.226 0.166 0.008 0.070
Nkoranza −0.349 0.326 −0.201 0.418 0.058 0.173 −0.323 0.258 −0.092 0.144
Bole −0.415 0.303 −0.573 0.430 0.215 0.146 −0.529* 0.282 −0.218* 0.118
Wenchi 0.082 0.208 0.101 0.391 −0.095 0.123 0.139 0.192 −0.099 0.111
Credit (pr) 0.168 0.196 −0.020 0.254 0.220** 0.112 0.031 0.189 −0.057 0.091
Extension service (pr) −0.057 0.075 −0.092 0.113 −0.044 0.050 −0.008 0.063 −0.012 0.036
Constant 4.832*** 0.340 6.066*** 0.490 7.674*** 0.193 2.051*** 0.245 1.432*** 0.160
Generalized residuals
(𝜌0)
0.408 0.407 −0.330 0.568 −0.091 0.224 0.431 0.262 −0.176 0.166
Interacted generalized
residuals (𝜌1)
−0.910* 0.540 −0.582 0.683 0.128 0.318 −0.678 0.421 −0.099 0.218
Wald 𝜒2 statistic 3,253.58*** 1,785.48*** 4,911.16*** 1,237.85*** 186.78***
Note. N = 391.
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
The reference district is Techiman. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
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T A B L E 5 Average treatment effects of contract farming on outcomes
Outcome variables Mean outcome ATE z-Value Change (%)
Cashew yields (kg/ha) 5.782 (0.718) 2.144 2.99*** 37.06
Net revenues (GHS/ha) 7.157 (1.154) 2.569 2.23** 35.85
Off-farm incomes (GHS/ha) 7.251 (0.449) −0.163 −0.36 −2.25
Labor productivity (kg/labor day) 2.230 (0.665) 1.373 2.06** 61.57
Price margins (GHS/kg) 1.597 (0.343) 0.734 2.14** 45.96
Note. N = 391.
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
latter use more family labor than the former. This implies that
contract farmers are able to engage more hired labor and are
able to carry out the required farming activities in less days
and under supervision. This is further justified by the fact
that noncontract farmers use more days of labor than contract
farmers (see Table 1). Hence, this shows that contract farmers
are more efficient in labor use, since they are able to engage
hired labor through incomes from CF and cash saved from
provision of advanced inputs. Thus, this enhances efficiency
and effectiveness in operation into more timely harvest.
Contract farmers also attain higher price margins because
of the guarantee and certainty in prices, which is not
susceptible to wide seasonal variations. Usually, given that
most cashew farmers are smallholders who are generally price
takers, these farmers tend to get lower prices during very
good harvest. Hence, this protects contract farmers from lower
prices during harvest, where the supply of cashew is normally
very high. To investigate possible trade-off effects due to CF
participation, we also look at off-farm income. We find a neg-
ative, but statistically insignificant impact of CF on off-farm
income. While Bellemare (2018) found a significantly neg-
ative effect of participation in CF on income from nonfarm
businesses of smallholder farmers in Madagascar, our find-
ings are in line with Benali et al. (2018) who did not find a sta-
tistically significant effect for vegetable farmers in Tanzania.
To provide some insights into how scale effects on farm
performance differ among contract farmers, we also analyzed
the impact of CF according to farm size. Table 6 represents the
ATE estimates by three farm size categories, which include
small (less than 1.5 ha), medium (1.5–4 ha), and large (more
than 4 ha) scales, since farms larger than 4 ha are consid-
ered as large cashew plantations (African Cashew Initiative,
2010).3
The estimates show that participation in CF significantly
increases cashew yields by 35%, 30%, and 25% for farmers
with small, medium, and large farm sizes, respectively, com-
pared to the average yield of a cashew farmer. We also find
that participation in CF tends to significantly increase net
3 The definition of farm size groups is based on the farm size cashew farmers
had before participating in CF.
revenues by 41%, 32%, and 29% for small-, medium-, and
large-sized farms, respectively. With respect to labor produc-
tivity, Table 6 shows that relative to other cashew farmers,
participation in CF is associated with a significant increase in
labor productivity by almost 67% for small farms, and 50% for
medium farms, while the coefficient for large-sized farms is
also positive, but not statistically significant. We further find
that participation in CF significantly increases price margins,
albeit more favorable for small farms. In particular, cashew
farmers with small farms experience significant gains in price
margins by 59%, while medium and large farms obtain 45%
and 41% increases in price margins, respectively.
Interestingly, the disaggregated estimates on off-farm
income show that the effects are not uniform across farm-
ers, but differ based on scale of the operation. Specifi-
cally, participation in CF significantly increases off-farm
income of small-sized cashew farmers by almost 7%, while it
decreases off-farm income of medium- and large-sized farms,
though, not statistically significant. This is not surprising
because of the difference in time requirement by the scale of
operation.
In effect, the findings indicate that there is substantial
heterogeneity in the impact of CF across scale of operation
and that smaller cashew farms tend to benefit more from
CF compared to medium- and large-sized farms. This
finding is in line with findings by Casaburi et al. (2016)
on sugarcane CF schemes in Kenya. Also, the results, put
together support the inverse farm size relationship as smaller
farmers benefit more from CF than medium and larger farms
(Carletto, Savastano, & Zezza, 2013; Henderson, 2015;
Khataza, Hailu, Doole, Kragt, & Alene, 2019). This is
because small farms have advantages in labor supervision and
knowledge. Smallholder farmers accumulate knowledge over
generations, which can offset their difficulty in accessing cap-
ital and insurance. Nevertheless, the findings should be inter-
preted with caution. For instance, Muyanga and Jayne (2019)
looked at a wider range of farm sizes in Kenya and find a
U-shaped relationship between farm size and productivity.
Even though the inverse relationship holds for very small
farms (0–3 ha), farms between 20 and 70 ha are substantially
more productive due to mechanization and reduced labor
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T A B L E 6 Average treatment effects of contract farming on outcomes disaggregated by farm sizes
Outcome variables Mean outcome ATE z-Value Change (%)
Cashew yields (kg/ha)
Small Farm (≤1.5 ha) (0.674) 2.024 3.00*** 35.05
Medium Farm (1.5–4 ha) 5.782 (0.647) 1.749 2.70*** 30.24
Large Farm (>4 ha) (0.680) 1.501 2.21** 25.95
Net revenues (GHS/ha)
Small Farm (≤1.5 ha) (1.092) 2.942 2.69*** 41.17
Medium Farm (1.5–4 ha) 7.157 (1.021) 2.310 2.26** 32.28
Large Farm (>4 ha) (0.971) 2.110 2.17** 29.62
Off-farm income (GHS/ha)
Small Farm (≤1.5 ha) (0.304) 0.507 1.67* 6.99
Medium Farm (1.5–4 ha) 7.251 (0.324) −0.109 −0.34 −1.50
Large Farm (>4 ha) (0.326) −0.396 −1.25 −5.46
Labor productivity (kg/labor day)
Small Farm (≤ 1.5 ha) (0.629) 1.502 2.39** 67.35
Medium Farm (1.5–4 ha) 2.230 (0.640) 1.134 1.77* 50.85
Large Farm (>4 ha) (0.695) 0.932 1.34 41.79
Price margin (GHS/kg)
Small Farm (≤1.5 ha) (0.310) 0.949 3.06*** 59.42
Medium Farm (1.5–4 ha) 1.597 (0.297) 0.721 2.42** 45.15
Large Farm (>4 ha) (0.308) 0.656 2.13* 41.08
Note. N = 391.
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
input per hectare. Moreover, the studies by Carletto, Gourlay,
and Winters (2015) and Dillon and Rao (2018) show that
self-reported farm sizes, as in our case, can lead to land
measurement bias. Small farmers tend to overestimate,
whereas large farmers tend to underestimate their land sizes
(Carletto et al., 2013).
6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Given the challenges smallholder farmers face in market-
ing their products, particularly with the emergence of super-
markets, CF has been widely identified as a means of help-
ing smallholder farmers to participate in value chains. This
paper contributes to the debate by examining the factors that
influence cashew farmers’ decisions to participate in CF and
the impacts of participation on labor productivity, price mar-
gins, as well as household welfare indicators such as yields,
net revenues, and off-farm income. We use household-level
data of 391 cashew farmers from Brong-Ahafo and Northern
regions of Ghana.
Simple comparisons of household welfare indicators
between contract and noncontract farmers revealed some sig-
nificant differences between the two groups. However, since
these average differences do not account for the confounding
effects of other individual characteristics such as risk prefer-
ences, farming ability, or motivation, we employed a control
function approach to estimate a switching regression model
that accounts for endogeneity and selection bias of observed
and unobserved characteristics.
The empirical results revealed that CF contributes to the
enhancement of agricultural productivity as well as improve-
ment of income of cashew farmers in Ghana. In particular, the
estimates show a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship between participation in CF and labor productivity, price
margins, as well as cashew yields, and net revenues. Specif-
ically, farmers who participate in CF significantly increased
labor productivity by 62% and price margins by 46%. The esti-
mates also showed that participation in CF resulted in signif-
icant increases in cashew yields by 37% and net revenues by
36%.
The estimates of CF impact across farm sizes revealed that
cashew yields, net revenues, labor productivity, and price mar-
gins of contract farmers were significantly higher for smaller
farms (less than 1.5 ha), compared to medium (1.5–4 ha),
and large-sized farms (more than 4 ha). An important finding
revealed by this analysis across farm size is that the impact
of CF on off-farm income is not uniform across farmers but
varies with the scale of operation. If one considers the impact
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in a more differentiated way, it shows that participation in CF
complements off-farm income for farmers with small farm
sizes but reduces off-farm incomes when the level of oper-
ation is large.
Returning to the issues raised in the introduction of this
paper, evidence has been generated that CF could prove use-
ful in advancing productivity and utilizing labor resources
in the cashew sector more effectively. Policies should there-
fore focus on attracting investment higher up in the value
chain (cashew processing) and introduce appropriate produc-
tion and processing technologies. The positive impact of CF
on labor productivity is especially interesting and suggests
that labor engagement through incomes from CF is one of
the key ways through which CF affects cashew revenues and
yields. This is important and implies that policy makers can
use CF in cashew production to augment labor demand. Poli-
cies should incentivize these jobs, which can help to reduce
rural–urban migration.
Improvement of infrastructure is another important aspect,
since contracting is usually concentrated in easily accessible
areas. This is also the case in Ghana, where farmers from the
Northern regions tend to face structural disadvantages com-
pared to farmers from the more favored Brong-Ahafo region.
In order to align regions, policies need to improve roads and
public transport, as well as access to airports and harbors. This
will not only reduce migration from the Northern regions of
Ghana to the South where the main cities are located, it is
also important when it comes to stronger commercialization
of Ghana’s cashew sector.
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Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
CF 0.997** 0.496 1.946*** 0.842 0.144 0.270 0.584 0.389 0.508* 0.268
Age 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.004* 0.002 0.002 0.003 −0.001 0.002
Female headed
HH
0.026 0.105 0.148 0.178 0.104* 0.057 0.044 0.082 0.051 0.057
Education −0.115 0.116 −0.172 0.197 −0.125** 0.063 −0.072 0.091 −0.019 0.063
Household size 0.024** 0.011 0.036* 0.019 −0.009 0.006 0.024*** 0.009 0.006 0.006
Farm size −0.088*** 0.023 −0.140*** 0.039 −0.218*** 0.013 −0.011 0.018 −0.035*** 0.013
Soil type 0.185** 0.082 0.202 0.140 0.064 0.045 0.105 0.065 0.072 0.044
Farm age 0.030*** 0.008 0.028** 0.013 −0.013*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.006 0.001 0.004
Farm records −0.055 0.180 −0.202 0.307 0.046 0.098 −0.090 0.142 −0.046 0.098
Market −0.020 0.016 −0.002 0.027 0.002 0.009 −0.023* 0.013 0.009 0.009
Farmer group −0.320*** 0.102 −0.434** 0.173 0.000 0.056 −0.303*** 0.080 −0.132** 0.055
Labor days 0.006*** 0.001 0.004** 0.002 0.004*** 0.001 −0.008*** 0.001 −0.001* 0.001
Mobile phone 0.229 0.141 0.450* 0.240 0.170** 0.077 0.142 0.111 0.087 0.077
Motorbike −0.046 0.094 −0.106 0.160 0.017 0.051 −0.069 0.074 −0.021 0.051
Nkoranza −0.656*** 0.161 −0.848*** 0.273 −0.006 0.088 −0.491*** 0.126 −0.132 0.087
Bole −0.956*** 0.141 −0.930*** 0.239 0.004 0.077 −0.741*** 0.110 −0.054 0.076
Wenchi −0.076 0.123 0.060 0.209 −0.063 0.067 −0.082 0.097 0.043 0.067
Credit (pr) −0.061 0.103 −0.057 0.174 −0.003 0.056 −0.045 0.081 0.002 0.056
Extension
service (pr)
0.091** 0.044 0.153** 0.075 0.021 0.024 0.083** 0.035 0.034 0.024
Constant 5.131*** 0.266 6.237*** 0.451 7.639*** 0.145 2.243*** 0.209 1.513*** 0.144
Wald 𝜒 300.82*** 105.35*** 1,288.15*** 282.10*** 21.22
F-value 9.380*** 9.380*** 9.380*** 9.380*** 9.380***
Note. N = 391.
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
The reference district is Techiman.
APPENDIX B: CORRELATION BETWEEN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE FARM RADIUS AND
OUTCOMES VARIABLES
Dependent variable Instrumental variable Correlation p-Value
Cashew yields Farm radius .059 .242
Cashew net revenues .083 .102
Off-farm incomes .097 .055
Labor productivity −.007 .886
Price margins .102 .045
APPENDIX C: CORRELATION BETWEEN CF PARTICIPATION VARIABLE AND
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
Dependent variable Instrumental variable Correlation p-Value
Contract farming Farmers’ perception of liquidity status −.028 .579
Farmers’ perception of extension service −.037 .463
